Abstract
Introduction
Recently, much attention has been attracted by attribute based cryptography (ABC). In ABC, an identity is a set of descriptive attributes instead of a single identity string. Attribute based encryption (ABE) has significant advantage over the traditional PKC primitives as it achieves flexible one to many encryption. Thus ABE [1] [2] [3] provides means for decentralized access control in large and dynamic networks and ubiquitous computing environments without the need of administrating large access control policies. Additionally, ABC achieves better identity privacy preserving since members do not necessarily have to know the identity of the other members with whom they communicate with.
In spite of the advantage of ABE, it is much more convenient and efficient using symmetric-key encryption with a key obtained in a group key exchange (GKE) protocol than using ABE to implement secure group communication in popular group-oriented applications and protocols. To efficiently secure group communication in ABC, we consider a scenario where participants in a GKE aim at obtaining a common session key with partners having certain attributes. In such a scenario, only members whose attributes satisfy the given policy can participate in the GKE without disclosing their identities. Such a GKE protocol is called an attribute-based group key exchange (AB-GKE) protocol.
Steinwandt and Corona proposed an attribute-based group key exchange protocol [5] which achieves forward secrecy recently. Their protocol uses an attribute-based signcryption scheme to authenticate the protocol messages. In independent work, Birkett and Stebila proposed a new concept of predicate-based key exchange [6] which encompasses attribute-based key exchange. In addition, they also proposed a predicatebased key exchange between two parties by combining a secure predicate-based signature scheme [6] with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [7] . Gorantla et al. proposed a (5)Delegate: inputs system public parameters, a private key pk corresponding to a set of attributes S, and a set S* S, outputs another private key pk* for S*. Delegate is an optional algorithm.
The security of EP-AB-KEM is a semantic security which ensures that any probabilistic polynomial time adversary cannot distinguish the symmetric key SK generated in encapsulation algorithm and a random value in the probability distribution of the symmetric key. We refer to [8] for more detail.
UC Framework
Canetti introduced the UC framework [9] to design and analyze the security of cryptographic primitives and protocols. In the UC framework, entities involved in the real execution of a protocol are a number of players, an adversary, and in addition an entity called the environment which represents everything outside of the protocol. In the ideal process of UC framework an ideal functionality of the protocol is defined and an adversary in the ideal process is introduced. Essentially, the ideal functionality is a trusted party that produces the desired functionality of the given protocol. Furthermore, the players in ideal process are replaced by dummy players, who do not communicate with each other but transfer messages between the ideal functionality and the environment.
Security is defined from the environment's point of view such that no environment can distinguish the execution of the real protocol and a simulation in the ideal process. More precisely, a protocol securely realizes an ideal functionality if for any real execution adversary, there exists an ideal process adversary such that no environment, on any input, can distinguish whether it is interacting with the real execution adversary and players running the protocol, or with the ideal process adversary and the ideal functionality. We refer to [9] for more detail.
ACK Property
The ACK property is first introduced by Canetti and Krawczyk [12] to implement UC security of two-party key exchange protocols, and is generalized to group key exchange in [10] . Roughly speaking, a GKE protocol has the ACK property if by the time the first player outputs a session key and no player in the session is corrupted, the internal states of all players in the session can be simulated given the session key and messages exchanged among these players.
Consider an interaction among an environment machine , an adversary, a GKE protocol π, and an algorithm I. π runs with and ; furthermore,  has not corrupted any player when the first player output a session key. Then I is given the session key and messages exchanged among these players, and generates "simulated" internal state for each player in the protocol. Next, the internal state of each player is replaced with the "simulated" internal state for this player, and the interaction of and  with π continues. I is called a good internal state simulator if no probabilistic polynomial time  can distinguish between the above interaction with π and I and an interaction with π in the real execution. 
Divisible Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem and Divisible Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Divisible computational Diffie-Hellman (DCDH) problem is a variation of CDH problem. Let q be a large prime number, G be a cyclic additive group of order q, and P be a generator of G.
DCDH problem: On input P, aP, and bP, where a,b∈Z q * , outputs (a/b)P. DCDH assumption: There is no probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine solves the DCDH problem with non-negligible probability.
Universally Composable Attribute-based GKE
To formally define the notion of UC security for attribute-based group key exchange, we present an ideal functionality  - as follows. Unlike traditional group key exchange functionality,  - checks whether attributes satisfies policy or not for each tuple (sid, number, policy, attributes, new-session). This ensures that only players whose attributes satisfy a given policy can participate in the protocol session. Furthermore, each player only knows the number of players in the session other than the identities of the players in initialization stage, so that the identity privacy is achieved.
Though our ideal functionality only handles a single protocol session, it is easy to use universal composition with joint state [13] to obtain the multi-session extension which handles multiple sessions of the protocol. In addition, focusing on single-session protocols simplifies the definitions and the analysis.
Functionality -  -  proceeds as follows, running on security parameter k, with players U 1 , U 2 ,…, U n , and an ideal adversary .
Initialization: Upon receiving (sid, number, policy, U i , attributes, new-session) from some player U i for the first time where number≥2 represents the number of players involved in this session, policy represents a policy that attributes of each player involved should satisfy, and attributes represents attributes of this player, checks that whether attributes satisfies policy or not. If true, records (sid, number, U i , policy) and sends it to , else aborts.
Forward secrecy is the notion that corruption of a player should not reveal previous session keys generated by the player. To model forward secrecy, the adversary is not given the session key on corruption of a party if the key has already been delivered to the player in  - .
UC Secure AB-GKE Protocol
This section shows our attribute-based group key exchange protocol followed with the security proof of the protocol. Our protocol is obtained by enhancing Gorantla et al.'s protocol [8] and is composed of two rounds. Each player sends a message to all other players in each round. Our basic strategy is ensuring ACK property by adding a new round of message sending. The new message of each player contains an ephemeral key which is used to ensure the ACK property. Additionally, in order to prevent impersonation attack in the new round of message sending, each player add an "blind" ephemeral value in first message and prove himself a valid player in the protocol by combining this value in the second message.
Since identities of players keep undiscovered in AB-GKE, impersonation-resilient in AB-GKE only guarantees each player participates in the second round of message sending is indeed a player participates in the first round of message sending and each participant in the first round indeed participates in the second round of message sending.
Notations
The notations in the protocol are listed below. k: system security parameter.
q: a large prime of k bits. G1,G2: two groups of prime order q. G1 is an additive group. e:G1×G1→G2: a bilinear map.
P: a generator of the group G1. f1: {0, 1}*→G1 is a secure hash function that models a random oracle. f2: {0, 1}*→Zq* is a collision-resistant hash function.
PK : the system public parameters of the EP-AB-KEM in the protocol.
A : the description of a policy.
pki : the private key of a player Ui in the EP-AB-KEM.
(Ci, SKi): the encapsulation pair obtained in encapsulation algorithm run by a player Ui. Figure 2 shows our protocol. Let U={U1, U2,…，Un} be the set of players who wish to establish a group key. Before the protocol, the Setup algorithm of an EKP-AB-KEM is executed, and the KeyGen algorithm is executed for each player in the protocol, so that each Ui∈U obtains a private key pki for the EKP-AB-KEM. Unlike the protocol of Gorantla et al. [8] , the protocol in Figure 2 has ACK property by using of eki and αP and by erasing internal state before finishing round 2.
Protocol Description
Before accepting the group key, each player Ui checks that whether the players who send messages in round 2 are indeed the players who send messages in round 1 and whether the ephemeral key held by other players are valid, so that any uncorrupted players in the same protocol session output the same group session key. Note that we do not take into account the case that the adversary who is a valid player in the protocol impersonates another valid player from the beginning, because identity privacy in ABC makes it impossible for a player to verify the identity of another player in a protocol session. All we can do is to guarantee the players who send messages in round 2 are indeed the players who send messages in round 1. Therefore we also assume broadcast messages sent by all players in round 1 are received by all players without being modified.
Figure 2. Our AB-GKE Protocol

Proof of Security
The security proof of our protocol is given in theorem 1. In order to prove the theorem, we introduce four lemmas first. Then the theorem is given based on these lemmas. Lemma 1. Except with negligible probability, if an uncorrupted player U i outputs a session key , then every uncorrupted player U j ∈U either holds internal state (αP, , sid·K, ek j ) which is held by U i before it outputs the session key or holds no state and outputs  as session key.
Proof. Assume that an uncorrupted player U i outputs a session key , when some uncorrupted player U j ∈U does not hold internal state (αP, , sid·K, ek j ) and does not output  as its session key.
(1) We prove that U j holds ek j =α j -1 sid K first. According to the description of protocol, U i outputs a session key after checking that whether e(α j P, ek j )=e(sid·K, P). Moreover, U j broadcasts ek j when it has already held the internal state (αP, , sid·K, ek j ). Thus there exists an adversary computes the ek j and sends it to U i without knowing α j (if the adversary computes α j , then it solves discrete logarithm) with non-negligible probability ε. If such an adversary  exists, we construct an algorithm  that solves DCDH problem [4] Our AB-GKE protocol Round 1.
Each U i ∈ U executes encapsulation algorithm of the EP-AB-KEM on the input (PK, ) where PK is the system public parameters and is the description of a policy that attributes of each player in the protocol should satisfy, and then obtains an encapsulation pair (C i , SK i ). In addition, U i chooses α i ∈Z q * randomly and broadcasts (C i , α i P).
Round 2.
Let α be a list of α i P for each i, i.e., α=(α 1 P, α 2 P, …, α n P). Upon receipt of all encapsulations C j for i≠j, each U i executes the decapsulation using private key pk i, on each C j and obtains
with a non-negligible probability. The algorithm  proceeds as follows when being input (P 1 , P 2 ), where P 1 , P 2 ∈G 1 :  takes  as its subroutine. Moreover,  plays the role of random oracle f 1 .  simulates an execution of the protocol among n players U 1 , U 2 ,…U n and chooses all parameters for U 1 , U 2 ,…U n . chooses one player U j , and sets α j P= P 1 . Moreover, when queried SK 1 ||SK 2 ||…||SK n to f 1 ,  replies f 1 (SK 1 ||SK 2 ||…||SK n )= sid -1 ·P 2 . If U j is corrupted by  in the simulation,  aborts, else  takes ek j computed by  as its answer to the divisible computation Diffie-Hellman problem. Because α j is chosen randomly in a real execution of the protocol and f 1 is a random oracle, simulates an execution of the protocol and the random oracle f 1 perfectly from 's view.
In a non-trivial execution of the protocol, at least one player keeps uncorrupted. Thus the probability that U j keeps uncorrupted in the above simulation is no less than 1/n. The probability that  solves DCDH problem on G 1 is at least ε/n. This contradicts the DCDH assumption.
Note that it also can be concluded that sid·K held by U j is equal to the sid·K held by U i before it outputs the session key, since ek j =α j -1 sid K.
(2) We then prove  held by U j is equal to the session key output by U i . Assume U j holds '≠. Since session key = f 2 ( )K and is public known before the session execution, U i and U j hold different K. Assume the K and sid held by U j be K * and sid
Note that sid and sid * can be computed before K and K * . Therefore after computing sid * and sid, K/ K * is already fixed. This contradicts that K and K * are computed from a random oracle. Furthermore, αP held by U j is equal to the αP held by U i before it outputs the session key according to the assumption that broadcast messages sent by all players in round 1 are received by all players without being modified.
In conclusion, U j either holds internal state (αP, , sid·K, ek j ) which is held by U i before it outputs the session key or holds no state and outputs  as session key.
Lemma 2.
If no player is corrupted in the protocol, any outsiders can not distinguish the session key and a random value in G 1 with non-negligible probability.
Proof. If no player is corrupted, the session key computed in the protocol is= f 2 ( )K＝ f 2 ( )f 1 (SK 1 ||SK 2 ||…||SK n ), where f 1 is a random oracle. Due to the nature of a random oracle, an outsider who can distinguish and a random value in G 1 must obtain SK 1 , SK 2 ,…, and SK n . This contradicts the security of EP-AB-KEM.
Lemma 3.
Except with negligible probability, any uncorrupted players in the same session who output a session key output the same session key.
Proof. From lemma 1, whenever an uncorrupted player in a protocol session outputs a session key , every uncorrupted player U j ∈U either holds internal state (αP, , sid·K, ek j ) or holds no state and outputs  as session key. Thus each uncorrupted player output  as the session key if it outputs the session key.
Lemma 4.
Our protocol has the ACK property.
Proof. When the first player in a protocol session outputs its session key, the internal state of another player in the session, say U j , consists of (α, , sid·K, ek j ). To prove the ACK property of our protocol, we construct an internal state simulator I as follows. Assume the first player U i output  as its session key. Given , I chooses α 1 ', α 2 ', …, α n '∈Z q * and β∈G 1 at random, then simulates the internal state for any U j (1≤j≤n, i≠j) as ((α 1 ' P, α 2 ' P, …, α n
Consequently, the verification of U j 's second message is e((α j ') -1 β, α j ' P)=e(β, P) rather than e(α j P, ek j )=e(sid·K, P).
We now prove that I is a good internal state simulator. Assume there is a probabilistic polynomial time environment  can distinguish the simulated internal states of all players and the internal states of all players in a real execution of the protocol with non-negligible probability. Because α 1 ', α 2 ', …, α n ' and α 1 , α 2 , …, α n are all chosen at random in Z q * as in a real execution,  only distinguishes β and sid·K. According to the security of EP-AB-KEM,  cannot distinguish SK i and a random value in Z q * for 1≤i≤n. Thus  cannot distinguish sid and a random value in Z q * because sid=f 2 (C 1 ||C 2 ||…||C n ||SK 1 ||SK 2 ||…||SK n ). This contracts that  distinguishes β and sid·K with non-negligible probability. Theorem 1. Our AB-GKE protocol securely realizes the ideal functionality - .
Proof(Sketch).
Let  be an arbitrary real-life adversary against our protocol. We show how to construct an ideal-process adversary  such that no probabilistic polynomial-time environment  can tell whether it interacts with  and players running our protocol in the real world, or with  and players communicating with  - in the ideal process.  proceeds as follows:
(1)  internally executes a copy of . Messages from  to  are forwarded to , and messages from  to environment are forwarded to .
(2)  generates public and private parameters for system and players, including all public parameters, system master key, and private keys for all players. All public parameters are given to .
(3) Upon receiving a message (sid, number, U i , policy) from  - for an uncorrupted player U i ,  invokes internally a simulated copy of the protocol being run by U i with session ID sid and gives the private key for U i generated in step(2) to this simulated copy. Any messages sent by  to U i are processed by this simulated copy, and any messages output by the simulated copy are forwarded to .
(4) When  corrupts a player, say U i ,  corrupts the corresponding player in the ideal process.  gives  private key of U i . In addition,  gives  the current internal state of U i in following way:
ⅰ. If  has not sent (sid, policy, ok) to  - yet, then  gives  the internal state of the simulated copy of the protocol being run on behalf of U i .
ⅱ. If  has already sent (sid, policy, ok) to  - , but has not sent (deliver, U i ) to  - yet, then  checks that whether the internal state of the simulated copy of the protocol being run on behalf of U i includes αP, sid K, and ek i . If not  aborts; otherwise  gives  the internal state of U i as ( , αP, sid K, ek i ) where  is the key obtained from  - when  corrupts U i in ideal process.
ⅲ. If  has already sent (sid, policy, ok) and (deliver, U i ) to  - , an empty internal state is given to . ⅳ. If a subset of players, say , are corrupted, in addition  has sent (sid, policy, ok) to  - already and no player in this session was corrupted at that point in time, then  sends (deliver, U i ) to  - .
ⅴ. If a subset of players, say , are corrupted, in addition  has sent a session
Analysis of the Simulation. From an environment 's view, the differences between an interaction with  and with  are concluded as follows:
①
Step (1), (2), (3), (4)ⅰ, and (4) ⅲ introduce no differences from the view of .
② In step (4) ⅱ,  may abort. In this situation,  has already sent (sid, policy, ok) to  - and the internal state of the simulated copy of the protocol being run on behalf of U i does not include αP, sid K, or ek i . The description of step (5) shows that  only sends (sid, policy, ok) to  - when some uncorrupted player in simulation outputs the session key. It can be obtained from lemma 1 that when some uncorrupted player outputs a session key and uncorrupted U i (U i ∈U) does not output the session key, U i does not hold the internal state (αP, , sid·K, ek j ) with negligible probability. Thus the probability for  to abort in this step is negligible.
③ Difference occurs when  aborts in step (5)ⅰ. In this situation,  has not received (sid, policy, U, ready) from  - and all players in the session is uncorrupted. From the description of and  - ,  - sends (sid, policy, U, ready) to  once all uncorrupted players in ideal process sends (sid, number, policy, U j , attributes, newsession) to  - ; while  invokes the simulated copy of the protocol for some uncorrupted player in ideal process, say U j , whenever  receives (sid, number, U j , policy) form  - .
This means the simulated copy for U j has not been invoked by  when a simulated copy of the protocol for some uncorrupted player outputs a session key. According to the description of  - , this occurs only with negligible probability. Thus  aborts in this step only with negligible probability. ④ In step (5)ⅱ, the key generated by  - and output by players in ideal process is chosen randomly, not '. If  never corrupts any player in this session, it is computationally indistinguishable whether a player in the ideal process outputs a random session key or a player in the real execution of the protocol outputs the session key ' from 's view according to lemma 2. If  corrupts some players later in this session before these players output the session key, then the situation is identical to step (5)ⅳ.
⑤
Step (5)ⅲ introduces difference when  aborts. This only occurs if there is some uncorrupted player in ideal process, say U j , has not sent (sid, number, policy, U j , attributes, new-session) to  - , while a simulated copy of the protocol being run on behalf of an uncorrupted player has outputs a session key. In the light of analysis in ③, this occurs only with negligible probability.
⑥
Step (5)ⅳ may introduce difference when the key generated by  - ,  does not equal '. In this situation,  obtains the key  from  - and replaces ' with as the output session key. Since our protocol has ACK property according to lemma 4,  simulates the internal states for all uncorrupted players and replaces the internal states of simulated copies of the protocol being run on behalf of all uncorrupted players with the simulated internal states. According to lemma 4,  can not tell the difference between the simulated internal states and real internal states of all players with non-negligible probability.
⑦ In step (5)ⅴ,  may abort.  sends a session key '' to  - only when some simulated copy of the protocol being simulated by  on behalf of an uncorrupted player U i outputs '' previously according to the description of . In addition, lemma 3 indicates that all uncorrupted players who output a session key will output the same session key.
Thus ''=', and  aborts in this step with negligible probability.
From above analysis, we can conclude that no probabilistic polynomial-time environment  can tell whether it interacts with  and players running our protocol in the real world, or with  and players communicating with  - in the ideal process. This completes our sketch of the proof.
Conclusions
We focus on secure AB-GKE protocol in UC framework in this paper. After presenting an ideal functionality of AB-GKE in UC framework, we propose a two-round AB-GKE which securely realizes the functionality. Our protocol is constructed from any secure EP-AB-KEM scheme follows the framework of CP-ABE. According to the security analysis, our protocol is universally composable.
